

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ISO-00 OMB-01 EB-11 AID-20

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 SAJ-01

MC-02 PC-10 IGA-02 OPR-02 COME-00 TRSE-00 CIEP-02

STR-08 AGR-20 INT-08 FEA-02 SCI-06 OPIC-12 DRC-01

/250 W

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R 251100Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7661

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 2504

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, AF, US, IR, UR, IN, PK

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY: PRINCIPAL AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS IN LAST THREE MONTHS

HAVE BEEN: (1) SLOW CONSOLIDATION OF DAOUD'S CONTROL OF THE
GOVERNMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE YOUNG LEFTISTS AND PARCH-

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AMISTS WHO CAME INTO POWER WITH HIM LAST JULY; (2) UNUSUALLY

ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY, STRESSING AFGHANISTAN'S NONALIGNMENT AND AIMED AT ISOLATING PAKISTAN IN THE REGION AND IN THE MOSLEM WORLD; (3) CONTINUING ECONOMIC STAGNATION, INCLUDING LACK OF INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OR INCENTIVES TO PRIVATE INVESTMENT. WE EXPECT DAOUD TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN HIS CONTROL AND AS HE DOES SO TO DEVOTE MORE OF HIS ATTENTION TO ECONOMIC MATTERS, BUT WE EXPECT THIS PROCESS TO BE A SLOW ONE BECAUSE DAOUD IS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT AROUSING OR COALESCING OPPOSITION. WE CAN EXPECT MORE OF THE SAME IN FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND IRAN. US-AFGHAN RELATIONS ARE ON AN EVEN KEEL IF NOT PARTICULARLY ACTIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. FOREIGN POLICY: AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY HAS BECOME MORE ACTIVIST AS GOA PURSUES ITS EFFORTS TO REALIGN REGIONAL PATTERNS AND STRESS ITS NONALIGNMENT BY MOVING AWAY SOMEWHAT FROM OVERSHADOWING INFLUENCE OF SOVIET UNION. IN FACT, WE ARE WITNESSING GREATER NUMBER OF INITIATIVES THAT HAVE PROBABLY EVER TAKEN PLACE IN FOREIGN POLICY FIELD (CREDIT IS POSSIBLY DUE IN PART TO EX-PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ WHO BEGAN PROCESS OF MORE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF GOA WITH OTHER COUNTRIES; BUT DAOUD, UNDOUBTEDLY WITH THE COUNSEL OF HIS BROTHER NAIM, HAS DRAMATICALLY EXPANDED THESE ACTIVITIES). LAST FALL'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NIXON ASKING HIM TO EXERT EFFORTS TO END ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, LETTERS TO IRANIAN AND IRAQI LEADERS TO END BORDER HOSTILITIES, AND NAIM'S RECENT TRIP TO FIVE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE INDICATIVE OF NEW DAOUD/NAIM ACTION-ORIENTED POLICY. BUT KEY FOCUS ON REGIME'S FOREIGN POLICY IS PUSHTUNISTAN, AND GOA HAS BEGUN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO CULTIVATE CLOSER TIES WITH INDIA AND IRAN IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE PAKISTAN. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA ALSO PROVIDES ALTERNATIVE TO ALMOST TOTAL RELIANCE ON SOVIET TRAINING AND SUPPLY.

A. INDIA: DAOUD REGIME'S INITIATIVE WITH INDIA WAS BEGUN SOON AFTER HE ASSUMED PRESIDENCY AND HAS INVOLVED VISITS TO INDIA BY NAIM AND TO KABUL BY SWARAN SINGH AND HIGH-LEVEL INDIAN MILITARY TEAM. WHILE THE INDIANS HAVE ONLY A VERY MODEST MILITARY AID POTENTIAL (MAINLY IN THE FORM OF TRAINING AND TECHNICIANS), THERE WOULD SEEM BE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE IN CONFIDENTIAL

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PURSUING IMPROVED RELATIONS. AS WE SEE IT, INDIAN INFLUENCE HAS SO FAR BEEN ON SIDE OF MODERATION AS CONCERNS PAKISTAN AND PUSHTUNISTAN.

B. PAKISTAN: WHILE DAOUD'S POLICY TOWARDS PASHTUNISTAN HAS NOT INCREASED IN MILITANCY SINCE JANUARY, HIS INTERVIEW WITH PAK JOURNALIST IN MID-APRIL REVEALED NO GIVE OR SOFT SPOTS IN POLICY. PAZHWAK'S HARD LINE ON PASHTUNISTAN AT LAHORE

SUMMIT CONFERENCE WAS NOT ELL RECEIVED BY ARAB LEADERS;
CONSEQUENTLY, DAOUD SENT HIS BROTHER NAIM AND DEPFONMIN
WAHID ABDULLAH ON TOUR OF MAJOR ARAB CAITSLS (MARCH-APRIL) TO
SEEK UNDERSTANDING OF AFGHAN VIEWPOINT AND COUNTER PAKISTANI
"PROPAGANDA." THIS IS PROBABLY MOST DRAMATIC INITIATIVE OF
DAOUD/NAIM AS WE CANNOT RECALL ANY SIMILAR SPECIAL MISSION
FROM AFGHAN CHIEF OF STATE TO ARAB COUNTRIES.

C. IRAN: AS INTERESTING AS GOA'S EFFORT TO IMPROVE ITS
RELATONS WITH INDIA IS ITS CURRENT EFFORT TO DRAW CLOSER TO IRAN.
DAOUD HAS OBVIOUSLY DECIDED THAT GOOD AFGHAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS
ARE NECESSARY, AND HE HAS WASTED NO TIME IN IMPLEMENTATION.
TRANSIT TRADE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED FOLLOWING DEPFONMIN
ABDULLAH'S END OF YEAR VISIT; AND NAIM AND ABDULLAH ARE
SCHEDULED TO VISIT TEHRAN IN EARLY MAY. EFFORT IS BEING MADE
ON BOTH SIDES TO PLAY DOWN HELMAND WATERS PROBLEM IN INTEREST
OF DEVELOPING BROADER TIES, AND ABDULLAH HAS EVEN BEEN TALKING
OF A JOINT AFGHAN-IRANIAN IRRIGATION DAM ON THE HELMAND NOT
FAR FROM IRANIAN BORDER WHICH COULD CONTROL FLOOD WATERS
AS WELL AS ALLOW NECESSARY FLOW DURING DRY SEASON. AFGHANS
ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN OTHER PROJECTS IN ECONOMIC FIELD AND
IN AN IMPROVED POLITICAL CLIMATE WHICH MIGHT, IN AFGHAN
EYES, LESSEN IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN SHOULD PASHTUNISTAN
QUARREL HEAT UP. WE DOUBT DAOUD WILL HAVE MUCH SUCCESS IN
LATTER SPHERE ALTHOUGH ECONOMIC PROJECTS MAY BE DEVELOPED IF
GOA CAN FIGURE OUT WAY GRACEFULLY TO ACCEPT IRANIAN LARGESSE.

D. USSR: THERE DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ANY MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
IN AFGHAN/SOVIET RELATIONS ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PROSPECTS FOR
NEW ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (SEE BELOW). SOVIET
MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES CONTINUE TO ARRIVE IN
SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS WITH 56 TANKS (23 T-62'S AND 33 T-55'S),
32 BTR 152 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND 36 MIG-17 AIRCRAFT
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KNOWN TO HAVE ARRIVED DURING MARCH AND APRIL.

3. PRC: SINCE THE GENERAL COOLING OF AFGHAN/PRC TIES NOTED

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 ISO-00 OMB-01 EB-11 AID-20

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MC-02 PC-10 IGA-02 OPR-02 COME-00 TRSE-00 CIEP-02

STR-08 AGR-20 INT-08 FEA-02 SCI-06 OPIC-12 DRC-01

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R 251100Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7662

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 2504

IMMEDIATE AFTER THE COUP, THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WARMING; NOR DO WE SEE ANY BASIS FOR PREDICTING ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED APRIL 21 APPEARS TO BE ROUTINE STEP.

F. US: RELATIONS WITH US HAVE REMAINED CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY AT HIGHER LEVELS BUT CONSTRAINED AT SOME WORKING LEVELS AS AID/PC/USIS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT. NEW AID LEGISLATION WILL REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN BILATERAL AID PROGRAM CONTENT OVER NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WITH MAJOR EMPHASIS ON PEOPLE-
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ORIENTED PROJECTS WHICH HELP POOR WITH MARKED DE-EMPHASIS ON CAPITAL PROJECTS. THIS WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO WORK THROUGH. OVERALL RELATIONSHIP REMAINS FIRM, AND WILL, WE BELIEVE, SLOWLY IMPROVE IN WORKING LEVELS OF MINISTRIES AS DAOUD INCREASINGLY EXTENDS HIS PERSONAL, DIRECT AUTHORITY. IN THE MEANTIME, WE CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE MINOR HARASSMENTS,

ENDING OF SOME US PROGRAMS (AMERICAN FIELD SERVICE, SOME PEACE CORPS PROJECTS, PRIVATE MEDICAL PROGRAMS OUTSIDE KABUL, AND RELUCTANCE OF EVEN MOST FRIENDLY AFGHANS TO HAVE VISIBLY CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

2. DOMESTIC POLICY:

A. DAOUD'S POSITION: PRESIDENT DAOUD HAS CONTINUED SINCE FIRST OF YEAR CONSOLIDATION OF HIS POLITICAL CONTROL. WHILE PERIOD ALMOST APPEARS HAVE BEEN ONE OF MAKING TIME APPROACHING STAGNATION, WE BELIEVE LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE ON MAJOR FRONTS HAS PASSED FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARCHAMISTS TO DAOUD AND HIS CABINET, AND ROLE OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS DECLINED EXCEPT AS IT SERVES DAOUD'S PURPOSES. IT APPEARS DAOUD AND HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES NOW BELIEVE THEMSELVES STRONG ENOUGH TO BEGIN LONG-HERALDED MOVE AGAINST MORE RADICAL LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT BUT IT IS LIKELY TO CONSIST OF "SALAMI TACTICS" - ONE MINISTER OR HIGH OFFICIAL REMOVED AT A TIME, AS HAS HAPPENED WITH LEFTIST MINISTERS OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS. DAOUD IS UNLIKELY TO TRY TO REMOVE HIS OPPONENTS IN ONE FELL SWOOP FOR FEAR OF CAUSING THEM TO COALESCE AGAINST HIM. RUMORS OF WIDESWEEPING CHANGES AT NAUROZ (MARCH 21) DID NOT MATERIALIZE BUT WE DO NOT INTERPRET THIS AS INDICATION OF ANY WEAKENING IN DAOUD'S POSITION OR RESOLVE. IT IS NOW BELIEVED IN MANY CIRCLES THAT DAOUD WILL COMPLETE HIS INTENDED CABINET LEVEL CHANGES BY JULY 17 (FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF COUP). CAVEAT REMAINS HOWEVER THAT PARCHAMISTS AND OTHER YOUNG LEFTISTS APPEAR STILL TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN THE REGIME. THEY MIGHT CHOOSE EARLY CONFRONTATION IN HOPE OF UNSEATING DAOUD, BUT BELIEVE MOVE OF THIS NATURE UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE RELATIVE INACTIVITY OF THE REGIME MAY CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. THIS WOULD INDICATE A WEAKER POSITION THAN WE CURRENTLY ATTRIBUTE TO DAOUD.

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B. RETURN TO NORMALCY? DAOUD APPEARS TO BE MANEUVERING CAREFULLY TO RESTORE THE TRADITIONAL BALANCE IN AFGHAN SOCIETY THAT WAS UPSET BY 1973 COUP. DAOUD IS ABOVE ALL STRONG AFGHAN NATIONALIST AND INTENDS TO STEER CAREFUL COURSE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WE BELIEVE HE WILL CONTINUE TO ALLOW PRO-WESTERN AND PRO-SOVIET INDIVIDUALS AND FORCES TO STRAIN AGAINST EACH OTHER WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY AS BEFORE; BUT WILL ATTEMPT TO CONCENTRATE MAJOR DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN HIS OWN HANDS. STRONG POLICY GUIDANCE CAN BE EXPECTED FROM HIM ON THOSE ISSUES UPON WHICH HE FOCUSES HIS ATTENTION. WE SENSE A DETERMINATION TO MOVE FORWARD ONCE THE POWER STRUGGLE HAS BEEN DEFINITELY RESOLVED. THIS FORWARD MOVEMENT, OF ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, WILL

CONTINUE HOWEVER TO BE SLOW AND WILL INVOLVE CONSTANT STRUGGLE AGAINST SCANTY RESOURCES - BOTH PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL. (REGIME'S DECISION TO LEAVE MANY WELL-TRAINED PEROSNS ON SHELF BECAUSE THEY ARE TAINTED BY ASSOCIATION WITH PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS WASTES NEEDED MANPOWER). IN TRYING TO MOVE THE COUNTRY FORWARD, DAOUD WILL ALSO HAVE TO COPE WITH TRADITIONAL AFGHAN CONFLICTS: BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN WAYS, BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT, AND BETWEEN MODERN AND TRADITIONAL. WE THEREFORE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT EXPECT RAPID PROGRESS. DAOUD IS NO REVOLUTIONARY AND WILL SEEK AFGHAN SOLUTIONS TO AFGHAN PROBLEMS.

C. MILITARY: MILITARY CHANGES DURING QUARTER HAVE MOVED CLOSER TO NORMAL OPERATIONS THAN ANY OTHER

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HOWEVER, WAS AGAIN HIT BY TOP-LEVEL CHANGES WHICH SEEM TO HAVE STRENGTHENED REGIME'S HAND.

D. ECONOMY: ECONOMICALLY, SIGNALS EMANATING FROM

(#)

STILL APPEARS
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BE IN DOLDRUMS WITH FEW NEW INITIATIVES. ON DEVELOPMENT SIDE, PROGRESS REMAINS PAINFULLY SLOW WHILE NEW GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO SORT ITSELF OUT AND DEVELOP LIST OF PRIORITIES. NO NEW MAJOR PROJECT
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Control Number: n/a
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Draft Date: 25 APR 1974
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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TAGS: PINT, PFOR, AF, US
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Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005